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ABSTRACT
We assess the impact of 401(k) plan design on four different 401(k) savings outcomes:
participation in the 401(k) plan, the distribution of employee contribution rates, asset allocation,
and cash distributions. We show that plan design can have an important effect on all of these
savings outcomes. This suggests an important role for both employers in determining how to
structure their 401(k) plans and government regulators in creating institutions that encourage or
discourage particular aspects of 401(k) plan design.
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I. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, defined contribution pension plans have gradually replaced defined
benefit pension plans as the primary privately-sponsored vehicle to provide retirement income.
At year-end 2000, employers sponsored over 325,000 401(k) plans with more than 42 million
active participants and $1.8 trillion in assets (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2000).
Because of the favorable tax benefits afforded to saving through employer sponsored pension
plans, it is important to understand how these plans actually affect the “desired” outcomes for
which the tax benefits are given.1
The growth of 401(k)-type savings plans and the associated displacement of defined benefit
plans has generated concerns about the adequacy of employee retirement savings. Defined
contribution pension plans place the burden of ensuring adequate retirement savings squarely on
the backs of individual employees. However, employers make many decisions about the design
of 401(k) plans that can either facilitate or hinder their employees’ retirement savings prospects.
Although the government places some limits on how companies can structure their 401(k) plans,
employers nonetheless have broad discretion in the design of their 401(k) plans.
Making good plan design decisions requires an understanding of the relationship between
plan rules and participant savings outcomes. In this paper, we assess the impact of 401(k) plan
design on four different 401(k) savings outcomes: participation in the 401(k) plan, the
distribution of employee contribution rates, asset allocation, and cash distributions. We show that
plan design can have an important effect on all of these different savings outcomes. This
suggests an important role for both employers in determining how to structure their 401(k) plans
and government regulators in creating institutions that encourage or discourage particular aspects
of 401(k) plan design.
II. Plan Design and 401(k) Participation
The 401(k) plan is only a useful tool for helping employees save for retirement to the extent
that employees actually participate in their employer-sponsored 401(k) plan. Recent research
suggests that when it comes to participation in the 401(k) plan, the key behavioral question is not
1

The annual tax expenditure association with employer-provided pension plans is estimated at $116 billion in 2004,
about equally split between defined benefit and 401(k) plans (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2004).
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whether or not employees participate in the 401(k) plan, but how long it takes before employees
are actually enrolled, and the enrollment protocol adopted by the firm is a significant determinant
in the answer to this question.
Automatic Enrollment and 401(k) Participation
In most companies, the 401(k) plan requires an active election on the part of employees to
initiate participation. That is, if the employee does nothing, the default is that the employee will
not be enrolled in the 401(k) plan. Because this is the most widely used 401(k) enrollment
protocol, we term this the “standard enrollment” approach to 401(K) participation. An alternative
but less widely used approach is to automatically enroll employees in the 401(k) plan, requiring
an active election on the part of employees in order to opt out of 401(k) participation.2
To examine the impact of automatic enrollment on 401(k) participation, we analyze the
administrative data on 401(k) participation at three large companies that adopted automatic
enrollment during the 1990s. Table 1 gives some basic characteristics (industry, firm size) on
these and other companies analyzed in this paper.
Figure 1, extending the analysis in Choi et al. (2002) and (2004), shows the dramatic impact
that the choice between these two different 401(k) enrollment protocols has on 401(k)
participation for three different companies that switched from a standard enrollment regime to
automatic enrollment between 1997 and 1998.3,4 Under a standard enrollment regime, 401(k)
participation is low initially and increases with employee tenure at a decreasing rate. Under
automatic enrollment, however, participation jumps to between 86% and 96% of employees once
it takes effect (between one and two months after hire in these companies) and increases only
slightly thereafter. At low levels of tenure, the difference in participation rates under the standard
enrollment and automatic enrollment regimes is substantial, with a difference of more than 50
percentage points at all three companies at 6 months of tenure. As participation increases with
tenure under standard enrollment, these differences diminish but remain sizeable even after
considerable periods of time. For example, at all three companies shown in Figure 1, employees
2

In a recent survey, Hewitt Associates (2001) reports that 14 percent of companies utilized automatic enrollment in
2001, up from 7 percent in 1999.
3
The data for Company C are restricted to employees over the age of 40. This is because the eligibility requirement
for employees under the age of 40 was changed at the same time that automatic enrollment was implemented.
4
The experience of company B is also discussed in Madrian and Shea (2001). Figure 1 essentially replicates the
analysis vis-à-vis participation in these earlier studies, but uses updated data allowing for a longer term analysis of
the impact of automatic enrollment.
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hired under automatic enrollment with 36 months of tenure have participation rates at least 30
percentage points higher than employees hired under standard enrollment with the same tenure.
Although we have shown evidence here for only three companies’ experiences with
automatic enrollment, Vanguard (2001) also documents large increases in 401(k) participation
following the switch from standard enrollment to automatic enrollment at fifteen different client
companies. The Vanguard results are not directly comparable, since its study analyzes only the
impact of automatic enrollment on company-wide participation rates rather than the impact by
tenure as we do here. However, its general findings are broadly consistent with those presented
here and in Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004).5 Choi et al. also document similar
effects on 401(k) participation rates when automatic enrollment is applied to previously hired but
non-participating employees as well as to newly hired employees going forward.
Requiring an Active Decision and 401(k) Participation
Choi et al. (2003c) discuss a third approach to 401(k) enrollment that they call “active
decision.” This approach avoids the default implicit in both the standard enrollment (default of
non-participation) and automatic enrollment (default of participation) protocols by requiring
employees to actively indicate their 401(k) participation decision by a specific date, regardless
of whether they want to enroll or not. Passively accepting a default is not an option. Choi et al.
(2003c) analyze the experience of one company that switched from using active decision to
standard enrollment in 1997. In this particular firm, Company D, the deadline for making a
401(k) participation decision was the 30th day of employment. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between tenure and 401(k) participation rates under these two different enrollment regimes.
Under active decision, there is a marked increase in 401(k) participation rates relative to
standard enrollment as employee election forms are processed between 2 and 3 months of tenure.
At three months after hire, 401(k) participation is 28 percentage points higher for employees
5

When looking at overall 401(k) participation rates, Vanguard finds that automatic enrollment increases
participation rates by 9 to 17 percentage points, depending on whether automatic enrollment applies to only newly
eligible employees or to all non-participating employees as well. While these magnitudes are smaller than the effects
documented here, they are not inconsistent with what we find. In most of the Vanguard companies, automatic
enrollment was applied only to newly hired employees and was implemented within only a few years of the
Vanguard study. The participation rates reported by Vanguard do not differentiate between employees hired before
and after the adoption of automatic enrollment as we do here. Rather, the participation rates are calculated across all
employees, and the figures reported for companies with automatic enrollment include both employees who were
subject to automatic enrollment (primarily low tenure employees), and those who were not. The Vanguard study
does note the limitations of this type of analysis.
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required to make an active choice. While we do not know how automatic enrollment would have
affected participation rates in this particular company, our guess is that automatic enrollment will
generally lead to higher participation rates than active decision. This is because procrastination
causes employees who do not want to be in the plan to delay opting out of 401(k) participation
under automatic enrollment, whereas this non-enrollment preference is acted upon quickly under
active decision.6
Automatic enrollment, active decision, and standard enrollment are three general approaches
to enrolling employees in the 401(k) plan. Another plan design parameter that directly affects
401(k) participation is plan eligibility. Figure 3 shows the relationship between tenure and 401(k)
participation rates for employees at three different companies who switched from either a 1-year
or a 6-month waiting period to immediate eligibility.7 Obviously, employees hired with
immediate eligibility will have higher participation rates at low tenure levels than those
employees hired with a waiting period.8 This gap, however, closes within a few months after the
waiting period expires at all three companies.
The Employer Match and 401(k) Participation
Enrollment protocols and eligibility requirements affect participation rates directly by
determining who can participate in the plan and the process required to enroll. There are several
other plan features that act upon 401(k) participation rates indirectly, either by making the plan
more attractive or by making the participation decision less complicated. The plan feature in this
vein that has received the most attention is the employer match, which many companies have
adopted specifically as an incentive to increase 401(k) participation.
Several studies have used cross-sectional data to document a positive correlation between the
availability of an employer match and 401(k) participation, including Andrews (1992), GAO
(1997), Bassett, Fleming and Rodrigues (1998), Papke and Poterba (1995), Papke (1995), Even
and Macpherson (2003b), Engelhardt and Kumar (2003), and Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang
(2003). Several studies have also documented a positive correlation between the level of the
6

We should note, however, that the fraction of employees opting out under automatic enrollment does not appear to
increase much over time. Most employees who do not want to be in the 401(k) plan opt out right away (Madrian and
Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004)).
7
Two of these three companies, D and E, are analyzed in Choi et al. (2002).
8
In the data, we observe a small fraction of employees enrolling prior to the date when they would seemingly be
eligible to participate. We believe these employees left the company and then were rehired with previous tenure
credited towards eligibility.
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employer match and 401(k) participation, including Papke and Poterba (1995), Engelhardt and
Kumar (2003), Huberman, Iyengar, Jiang (2003), Mundell, Sunden and Taylor (2000), and Clark
and Schieber (1998). A limitation of many of these studies is that with cross-sectional data, they
cannot control for the correlation between the employer match and other unobserved factors that
affect 401(k) savings behavior.
The results on the relationship between the match rate and 401(k) participation are more
varied in the studies that explicitly attempt to account for the potential correlation between the
employer match and other unobserved factors that may affect savings. Even and Macpherson
(2003b) use an instrumental variables approach to account for the endogeneity of the employer
match and still find a large positive impact of matching on 401(k) participation. However, it is
not clear that the firm characteristics they use as instrumental variables are in fact uncorrelated
with unobservable employee savings preferences.
Another approach to dealing with the potential correlation between the match rate that
employees face and unobserved factors that also affect 401(k) savings is to exploit changes in the
match rate that individuals receive while employed at a particular firm. This approach will be
valid if other unobserved factors do not change discretely at the time of the match rate change.
By using longitudinal data on firms, Papke (1995) is able to include employer fixed effects to
account for the correlation between the employer match and other factors that affect savings
behavior. With the addition of these fixed effects, the relationship between the employer match
and 401(k) participation disappears, but these results are difficult to interpret because Papke only
observes average match rates, not marginal rates.
Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) examine several years of individual-level data in a
company whose match rate varied from year to year based on the company’s prior-year
profitability. They also find no relationship between the match rate and 401(k) participation.
However, the transient nature of the match rate changes at this company and their potential
correlation with job security make it difficult to extrapolate these results to the permanent match
changes that most companies are likely to consider.
Choi et al. (2002) study a company that introduced a permanent match where there was none
previously. In contrast to the previous literature, which has focused on firm-level participation
rates or binary indicators of individual-level participation at a point in time, Choi et al. (2002)
model participation using a hazard model. Given the participation-tenure profiles in Figures 1
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and 2, this is a more sensible approach to modeling the 401(k) participation decision. Although
their results are difficult to generalize because they are estimated from only one company, they
find that having a match leads to earlier 401(k) participation.9 Moreover, the magnitude of the
estimated effect is quite large, with a 25% match leading to roughly a 40% increase in tenurespecific participation rates.10
Overall, our assessment of the literature on the relationship between the employer match and
401(k) participation rates is that having a match increases the probability of 401(k) plan
participation, although the magnitude of this effect has not been decisively estimated. There is
less certainty about the extent to which increasing an already positive match rate leads to further
increases in 401(k) participation.
The Menu of Funds Offered and 401(k) Participation
A plan feature with a somewhat paradoxical effect on participation is the degree of
investment choice available to plan participants. Papke (2004) finds that having the ability to
direct the asset allocation of contributions to an employer-sponsored savings plan leads to a large
36 percentage point increase in the probability of participating. By extension, one might think
that having a greater number of funds available should make participation in the 401(k) plan
even more attractive. Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2003), however, document a strong negative
relationship between the number of funds offered in a 401(k) plan and average participation
rates; increasing the number of funds offered by 10 leads to a 1.5 to 2.0 percentage point decline
in the firm-level average 401(k) participation rate. The explanation offered is that increasing the
number of options available to participants overwhelms them. Not only the number of funds, but
the types of funds available in the fund menu have the potential to affect 401(k) participation.
Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang (2003) find a 2.5 percentage point higher probability of 401(k)
participation in firms for which company stock is an investment option. While intriguing, these
results share the same problem as much of the matching literature: in cross-sectional data, it is

9

The company examined in Choi et al. (2002) implemented a match of $0.25 per dollar contributed on the first 4%
of contributions.
10
Choi et al. (2002) also examine the impact increasing the match threshold at a specific firm (Firm G in Figure 5)
has on the 401(k) participation hazard. As one might expect for a change that does not affect the marginal incentives
to participate in the 401(k) plan, they find that this increase in the match threshold has no significant effect on
participation.

8

difficult to control adequately for correlation between the fund menu and other unobserved
characteristics that also affect 401(k) participation.
Loans and 401(k) Participation
A final 401(k) plan feature designed to make participation more attractive is the option for
participants to take out a loan against their plan balances. To our knowledge, the only study that
has examined the relationship between loan availability and 401(k) participation is a GAO study
(1997). Using cross-sectional firm-level data, the GAO finds that participation rates in plans that
allow for loans are 6 percentage points higher than in plans that do not allow for loans. The same
caveat applies to this study as to many others already discussed: there is a potential correlation
between loan availability and other unobserved plan or individual characteristics that also affect
401(k) participation.
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and 401(k) Participation
While not an explicit feature of 401(k) plan design, the availability of a defined benefit
pension plan could also be relevant to the 401(k) participation decision. The empirical evidence,
however, on the relationship between defined benefit pension plan coverage and 401(k)
participation is mixed. Andrews (1992), Bernheim and Garrett (2003) and Papke (1995) all find
that individuals covered by another non-401(k) pension plan are less likely to participate in a
401(k) plan. Similarly, Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor (2000) estimate a negative relationship
between defined benefit pension wealth and the probability of participation in a 401(k) plan,
while Clark and Shieber (1998) find that having a more generous defined-benefit pension plan is
negatively correlated with the probability of participating in a 401(k) plan (although the
estimated effect is small in magnitude). In contrast, Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang (2003) show
that mean 401(k) participation rates are much lower for employees working in firms that offer a
defined benefit pensions plan than in firms that do not (68% vs. 76%), but that this difference in
401(k) participation probabilities is completely eliminated once other observable individual and
plan-level attributes are controlled for. Even and Macpherson (2003b) find that the probability of
401(k) participation is actually higher for those employees covered by a defined benefit pension
plan or another type of defined contribution plan. They conjecture that participation in another

9

non-401(k) pension or savings plan proxies for a strong unobserved taste for saving which
carries over into higher 401(k) participation probabilities.
Summary: 401(k) Plan Design and 401(k) Participation
If the goal of either employers or government regulators is to achieve the highest possible
401(k) participation rate, the single most effective intervention is automatic enrollment.
Automatic enrollment, however, is far from being ubiquitous. There are two primary concerns
employers have about automatic enrollment. First, many firms worry about the potential legal
liability associated with automatic enrollment, despite the fact that the U.S. Treasury Department
has issued a series of opinion letters supporting the use of automatic enrollment.11 Second, the
key reason behind automatic enrollment’s success at increasing participation rates—making
participation the default—is also its greatest drawback: employees tend to stick with the default
contribution rate and asset allocation chosen by the employer (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et
al. 2004).
Although the empirical research on the active decision approach to 401(k) enrollment is, at
this point, largely a case study, this approach does appear to achieve most of the participation
gains associated with automatic enrollment without the drawbacks. Employees do not face an
employer-selected default contribution rate and asset allocation, and consequently end up
choosing for themselves. Choi et al. (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) provide a theoretical framework
for thinking about the tradeoffs in the adoption of automatic enrollment, standard enrollment, or
active decision. In particular, Choi et al. (2003c) discuss the circumstances in which each of
these approaches is likely to be optimal from the perspective of a benevolent employer interested
in maximizing employee welfare within the 401(k) plan.
Other plan features, such as instituting or increasing an employer match, offering 401(k)
loans, or limiting the number of funds available, also have the potential to increase 401(k)
participation rates. However, the participation effects from these interventions are decidedly
smaller than those that can be obtained by focusing directly on facilitating enrollment.

11

See IRS Revenue Rulings 98-30 (Internal Revenue Service 1998) and 2000-8 (Internal Revenue Service 2000a).
See also Revenue Rulings 2000-33 and 2000-35 (both Internal Revenue Service 2000b).
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III. Plan Design and 401(k) Contribution Rates
Once employees have initiated participation in the 401(k) plan, the choice that has the
greatest direct impact on asset accumulation is how much is contributed to the plan. There are
four key elements of 401(k) plan design that affect employee contribution choices: the default
contribution rate, the match threshold, the maximum contribution rate, and the legal limit on total
dollars contributed. The first three of these are parameters over which employers have a large
amount of discretion, while the last is dictated to employers by the government (although
employers can choose to have a maximum contribution amount that is lower than the
government limit). There is a large literature examining the impact of the employer match rate on
contributions, but little attention has been given to these other features of plan design.
Automatic Enrollment and 401(k) Contribution Rates
The most powerful instrument for affecting employee contributions is the default
contribution rate. The dashed lines in Figure 4 show the relationship between tenure and the
fraction of 401(k) participants at the automatic enrollment default contribution rate in the three
automatic enrollment companies previously shown in Figure 1.12 (We will discuss the solid gray
and black lines in Section IV.) At all of these companies, the default contribution rate is low
(either 2 or 3%) and well below the match threshold (6% at all three). The thicker dashed lines
give the profiles for employees who were hired under automatic enrollment and thus directly
affected by the automatic enrollment default. The thinner dashed lines give the profiles for
employees hired before automatic enrollment and who voluntarily chose a contribution rate equal
to the automatic enrollment default.
At low levels of tenure, over 70% of participants at all three of these companies contribute at
the default. The fraction of participants at the default decreases with tenure as participants
gradually move to a different (usually higher) contribution rate. Nonetheless, a large fraction of
participants remains at the default contribution rate even after 3 or 4 years. This stands in marked
contrast to the contribution rates chosen by participants at these same companies prior to
automatic enrollment. The lower dashed lines in Figure 4 show that very few participants not
12

The lines in Figure 4C display much more variability than the lines in Figures 4A and 4B. This is because the
sample in Company C is restricted to employees over the age of 40 and hence smaller. The lines in Figure 4B do not
exhibit the sharp increase in months 2-3 seen for Companies A and C because the opt-out period in Company B was
shorter than in Companies A and C and the participation status for employees at Company B is not observed before
the opt-out period ends. See Choi et al. (2004) for more discussion of these patterns.
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subject to automatic enrollment selected the automatic enrollment default contribution rate.
Rather, the modal contribution rate for these employees was the 6% match threshold. (This is not
shown by the lines in Figure 4.) Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) show that the
prominence of the default contribution rate under automatic enrollment arises both from moving
employees from a zero contribution rate to the default contribution rate (the participation effect
discussed in Section II) and from moving employees who would have been at a different
(typically higher) positive contribution rate to the default.
Automatic Contribution Rate Escalators and 401(k) Contribution Rates
Another 401(k) plan feature designed explicitly to increase employee contribution rates is an
automatic contribution rate escalator. The prototypical implementation of this type of escalator is
the “Save More Tomorrow” (SMarT) plan developed by Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler
(Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). Under SMarT, participants consent to allow their contribution rate
to increase in the future if they take no further action; in other words, they opt into a default of
rising contributions. The striking results of the first experiment with the SMarT plan, in which
employees signed up for future contribution rate increases of 3 percentage points per year, are
reported in Benartzi and Thaler (2004). At the company studied, employees who elected to
participate in the SMarT plan saw their 401(k) contributions increase by 8.1 percentage points
over 3 years, from 3.5 to 11.6% of pay. In contrast, employees who elected not to participate in
the SMarT plan had higher initial contribution rates but increased their 401(k) contributions by
only 4.3 percentage points over 3 years, from 4.4 to 8.7% of pay. These results show that an
automatic contribution rate escalator can have an enormous impact on contribution rates.
The Employer Match and 401(k) Contribution Rates
The empirical evidence on matching and 401(k) contribution rates is even less decisive than
that on 401(k) participation. This may be because in theory, the effects of a match are less
straightforward as well, a point that has not been recognized in much of the literature. While
introducing an employer match where there was none before should lower the contribution rates
of employees who were already contributing in excess of the match threshold (an income effect),
its impact on those previously contributing at or below the match threshold is ambiguous
(opposing income and substitution effects). The effects are similar for increasing the match rate

12

while maintaining the same match threshold. The effect of increasing an existing non-zero match
threshold while keeping the match rate constant should vary with the initial contribution rate. For
those employees contributing below the old threshold, an increase in the match threshold should
have no effect; for those at the old threshold, contribution rates should increase (a substitution
effect); for those above the old threshold but below the new threshold, the change in contribution
rates is theoretically ambiguous (opposing income and substitution effects); and for those
initially contributing above the old threshold, contribution rates should decrease (an income
effect).
The empirical literature on matching and 401(k) contribution rates has focused largely on the
relationship between the match rate and average 401(k) contribution rates. Andrews (1992) finds
that a higher employer match rate reduces the average 401(k) contribution rate; Bassett, Fleming
and Rodrigues (1998) find no effect; Papke and Poterba (1995), Even and Macpherson (1997),
and Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) find a positive relationship. Papke (1995) finds a
positive effect of the match rate on total employee contributions at low match rates but a
negative effect at higher match rates. Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang (2003) find a positive
relationship between the match rate and the average employee contribution to the 401(k) plan,
but attribute most of this effect to the increase in participation induced by a higher match; among
participants, they find that higher match rates actually reduce contributions except for those with
very high income. Similarly, Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002) find little relationship between
the match rate on the first dollar of employee contributions and total 401(k) contributions.
Although somewhat disconcerting, the disparate results from these studies are not so surprising
given that theory has little to say about the impact of the match rate on average 401(k)
contributions.
The two papers that have tried to analyze the impact of the employer match on 401(k)
contributions in a manner consistent with the economic theory outlined above are Choi et al.
(2002) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2003). These two papers, however, take very different
empirical approaches.
Engelhardt and Kumar (2003) use non-linear budget constraint methods to estimate how
much employees contribute to the 401(k) plan. This methodology explicitly incorporates both the
match rate and the match threshold in the employees’ optimization problem. They find that

13

401(k) contributions do increase with a higher match rate, both on the participation margin and
the contribution margin conditional on plan participation.
Choi et al. (2002) use participant-level data combined with plan-level information on match
rates and thresholds. They show how the distribution of contribution rates responds to a change
in the structure of the 401(k) match at two different companies. In Figure 5A, the distribution of
contribution rates is shown for two sets of 401(k) employees at Company E: those who were
hired from July 1998 through December 1999 (before the company offered a match), and those
who were hired from July 2000 through December 2001 (after the company implemented a 25%
match on the first 4% of pay contributed to the plan).13 Before the employer match, the most
frequently chosen contribution rates of plan participants were 5%, 10%, and 15%.14 After the
employer match, there was a large increase in the fraction of employees with a 4% contribution
rate—the new match threshold—relative to the older cohort at the same level of tenure. This is
consistent with the economic incentive employees face to contribute at the match threshold, and
also with the hypothesis that the match threshold serves as a powerful focal point for employees’
contribution rate choices. Note that the increase in the fraction of employees at the 4%
contribution rate does not appear to be offset by a decrease in the fraction of employees at other
contribution rates; rather, it appears to be driven by increased participation in the plan (as
discussed in Section II).
Figure 5B shows the impact of changing the match threshold in Company G, where there was
a pre-existing match (also documented in Choi et al. 2002).15 Before 1997, union workers
received a 50% match on the first 5% of income contributed to the 401(k) plan, while
management received a 50% match on the first 6% of income. Employees were free to invest
their match money in any of the funds in the 401(k) menu. On January 1, 1997, the match
threshold for union employees increased to 7%, while that for management increased to 8%.
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Because this implementation of a match affected participation in the 401(k) plan as discussed in Section II (and as
the theory described above would predict), the distribution of employees at the various contribution rates in Figure
5A is based on the full sample of employees, not just plan participants. We have, however, excluded the noncontributors (those at a 0% contribution rate) from the graph because they constitute a large fraction of the sample,
and including them obscures the variation in contribution rates across the contributing population. As a result, the
distribution of contribution rates in Figure 5A does not sum to 100%.
14
Anecdotally, contributions rates that are a multiple of 5 are quite common in companies without a match and
among employees who are saving well above the match threshold in companies that have a match.
15
As noted in footnote 10, Choi et al. (2002) document that the increase in the match threshold at this company does
not increase 401(k) participation. The comparison of the two cohorts in Figure 5B is thus not contaminated by a
selection effect, as is the case with the de novo adoption of a match in Figure 5A.
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Contributions up to the new threshold were still matched at 50%, but the match on the
incremental 2% was invested in employer stock.
The black bars in Figure 5B show the distribution of initial contribution rates for workers
who enrolled in the plan from April to December 1996, when the lower (5 or 6%) match
threshold was still in effect. The distribution for workers who initiated participation from April
to December 1997 after the higher (7 or 8%) match threshold was adopted is shown by the gray
bars. The switch from the old threshold to the new threshold is clearly apparent, with a
substantial fraction of participants choosing whatever the relevant match threshold was (33% at
the higher threshold, and 43% at the lower threshold). Figure 5B also shows the importance of
contribution rates that are multiples of 5 for employees who choose to save at a rate above the
match threshold.
Overall, our assessment of the relationship between the 401(k) match and contribution rates
is that the match matters: both a higher match rate and a higher match threshold lead to higher
contribution rates. The widely divergent empirical results in the literature on matching appear to
result from empirical analysis that does not carefully account for the effect of both the match rate
and the match threshold on employee contribution rates.
The Menu of Funds Offered and 401(k) Contributions
The impact of investment options on contribution rates has only recently been examined in
the literature, and the results are limited. Papke (2004) finds that the ability to exercise choice
over investment allocations in defined contribution plans increases contribution rates by one to
three percentage points relative to the contribution rate that would be chosen in the absence of
participant direction. Similarly, Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002) find that having investment
discretion increases contribution amounts by 27 percent. On the other hand, consistent their
results on fund options and participation discussed in Section II, Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang
(2003) find that increasing the number of fund options results in lower contribution rates. In
contrast to their results on participation, they find no systematic effect on contributions of the
availability of company stock in the fund menu.
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Loans and 401(k) Contributions
There is little literature examining the impact of loan provisions in 401(k) plans on
contribution levels. Two of the three studies we are aware of suggest that giving employees the
option to borrow from their 401(k) accounts increases contribution rates. Specifically, the GAO
(1997) uses cross-sectional firm-level data and finds that average annual employee contributions
in 401(k) plans with loan provisions are 35% higher than in plans that do not offer loans.
Similarly, Holden and VanDerhei (2001) analyze participant-level data and find that on average,
a participant in a plan offering loans contributes 0.6 percentage points more of his or her salary
to the plan than a participant in a plan without loans. In contrast, Cunningham and Engelhardt
(2002) find only mixed evidence that access to 401(k) savings through loans or hardship
withdrawals has any impact on employee contributions.
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and 401(k) Contributions
As with the empirical evidence on defined benefit pension plan coverage and 401(k)
participation, the empirical evidence on the impact of defined benefit pensions on 401(k)
contributions is also mixed. Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002) find that non-401(k) pension
coverage is associated with substantial reductions (22 to 44%) in 401(k) contributions. Munnell,
Sunden, and Taylor (2000) find that conditional on participation, the level of wealth in a defined
benefit plan has a negative but insignificant impact on 401(k) contribution rates. Similarly, Clark
and Shieber (1998) find no difference between the 401(k) contribution rates of participants that
do and do not have a defined benefit pension plan. In contrast, Huberman, Iyengar and Jiang
(2003) find that those covered by a defined benefit pension plan contribute slightly more on
average to their 401(k) plan.
Summary: 401(k) Plan Design and 401(k) Contributions
401(k) plan design clearly has an important impact on 401(k) contribution rates. Employees
tend to save at contribution rates that are either multiples of 5 or that serve some specific purpose
in the 401(k) plan—the default contribution rate, the match threshold, or the maximum
contribution rate. This suggests that employers can have a tremendous impact on how much
employees save for retirement simply by changing the design of their 401(k) plan. Companies
can easily increase the amount that employees save in their 401(k) plan by increasing the default
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contribution rate, setting a higher match threshold, or increasing the maximum contribution limit
(although different employees will be affected by changes to these different contribution rate
parameters). Companies can also increase the amount that employees save by making automatic
contribution rate escalators available or the default. Other aspects of plan design, such as the
match rate or 401(k) loan availability, have some effect on employee contributions, but these
effects are small relative to the effects of explicitly changing the contribution rates that serve a
plan design purpose or incorporating automatic escalators into the plan design.
IV. Plan Design and the Allocation of 401(k) Assets
The impact of plan design on 401(k) savings also includes the allocation of assets within an
employee’s 401(k) account. For this aspect of savings, the plan features that matter most are
whether or not participants have investment discretion and the menu of funds available.
Participant Choice and 401(k) Asset Allocation
Obviously, if the employer chooses how plan assets are allocated and participants have no
investment discretion, then asset allocation is completely determined by plan design. The impact
of participant discretion on asset allocation then turns on how individuals invest differently from
their employers. Papke (2004) finds that for participants with investment choice, the share of
assets allocated to equities is 13 percentage points higher than for participants with no
investment choice.16 Conditional on choice being available, however, offering investors more
options in their menu of funds appears to have the opposite effect on asset allocation. Iyengar
and Jiang (2003) find that an increase in the number of funds available to participants is
correlated with a shift in asset allocation out of equities and into less risky money market and
bond funds. They speculate that this effect arises because having more funds from which to
choose increases the loss aversion associated with the asset allocation decision, leading investors
to favor more conservative assets such as money market funds.

16

Papke (2003) finds that profit-sharing plans, where employers often allocate contributions to company stock, are
an exception to this result. In these plans, participant choice actually results in a lower fraction of assets being held
in equities, presumably because participants who are given a choice diversify out of company stock.
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The Menu of Funds Available and 401(k) Asset Allocation
Another important aspect of plan design is what kinds of funds are available to plan
participants. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) study the relationship between the menu of investment
choices and asset holdings across different asset classes. They suggest that participants use naive
diversification strategies that are heavily influenced by the menu offered by their plan; a plan
sponsor that offers ten equity options and five non-equity options may be subtly influencing its
employees to put two-thirds of their money into equities. Using data on plan-level asset
allocation, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find a positive relationship between the fraction of equity
funds offered by a plan and the fraction of the overall plan portfolio invested in equities.
Company Stock and 401(k) Asset Allocation
Perhaps the most economically important plan feature influencing asset allocation is whether
or not company stock is included as an investment option, and if so, whether or not the employer
match is invested in company stock. Several recent papers have documented the excess risk that
employees face when company stock comprises a large fraction of their 401(k) portfolio.17
Interestingly, ERISA restricts defined benefit pension plans’ investment in the stock or real
estate of the employer to 10% of total assets. 401(k) plans, however, are exempt from this rule.
As a result, many companies have 401(k) plans in which company stock is not only available as
an investment option, but it is the predominant investment choice.
Holden and VenDerhei (2001) and VanDerhei (2002) report that across all 401(k) plans—
both those with and without company stock as an investment option—19% of assets are held in
company stock. Among those plans that do include company stock as an investment option, the
fraction of assets held in company stock is obviously much higher. These plans can be further
categorized into plans where participants have full discretion over their investments and plans
where participants have discretion over their own contributions but the employer match is
invested in company stock. In the latter type of plans, some companies allow participants to
immediately trade out of company stock, while others impose holding requirements.18 Holden
and VanDerhei (2001) and VanDerhei (2002) report that in plans offering company stock as an
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See for example Muelbroek (2002), Poterba (2003), and Even and MacPherson (2003).
There are government regulations requiring that employees in 401(k) plans be given the right to diversify out of
company stock upon reaching age 55. If company stock in a 401(k) plan is held through an ESOP, employees must
be allowed to diversify up to 25% of the company stock in their accounts once they reach age 55 and have 10 years
of participation in the plan. At age 60, the fraction rises to 50%.
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investment option but not matching in company stock, 29% of assets are held in company stock;
in plans where the employer match is directed into company stock, a much larger fraction of
assets, 53%, is held in company stock. While these numbers are simply averages across plans
and do not control for differences in other investment options and plan participant demographics,
they nonetheless suggest that plan design greatly influences the risk that employees face in their
401(k) portfolio through potentially excessive holdings of company stock. They are also
consistent with the evidence presented in sections II and III on the impact of defaults on 401(k)
participation and contribution rates; defaulting employer matching contributions into company
stock will greatly affect asset allocation, even if employees are able to immediately diversify out.
Automatic Enrollment and 401(k) Asset Allocation
Automatic enrollment defaults affect not only participation status and contribution rates, but
also asset allocation. Figure 4 shows the relationship between tenure and the fraction of
participants who are 100% invested in the default fund (the gray lines) or who are 100% invested
in the default fund and also contribute at the default contribution rate (the solid black lines). The
thicker lines give the profile for employees who were hired under automatic enrollment and are
thus directly affected by the automatic enrollment default. The thinner lines give the profile for
employees hired before automatic enrollment and who voluntarily chose an asset allocation equal
to the automatic enrollment default. The difference in asset allocation between the two regimes is
just as dramatic as the difference in contribution rates, and the persistence of the default asset
allocation is similar to that of the default contribution rate.
The economic significance of automatic enrollment’s impact on asset allocation depends on
which default fund employers choose. Empirically, most companies with automatic enrollment
have chosen a conservative default—either a money market fund or a stable value fund.19 In
these companies, automatic enrollment results in a more conservative 401(k) portfolio.

19

A recent Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001) survey reports that 76% of automatic enrollment
companies have a stable value or money market default fund. These finding are echoed in a report on Vanguard
client experiences with automatic enrollment: 53% have a stable value or money market default fund (Vanguard
2001).
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Other Plan Features and 401(k) Asset Allocation
There are two other plan features that could potentially affect asset allocation but on which
little actual evidence is available. The first is automatic rebalancing. This is typically a voluntary
program (although it could be made the default) where participants select an asset allocation that
the plan maintains by periodically rebalancing. This is designed to keep asset allocations from
becoming too heavily weighted towards asset classes that have done well in the recent past.
Another interesting plan feature is the inclusion of a managed investment option, where a
professional money manager chooses the allocation of investments. Recent research by Benartzi
and Thaler (2002) suggests that many participants would prefer an investment allocation chosen
by others to the investment allocation that they themselves choose. It is unclear at this point,
however, how the inclusion of such an option would affect asset allocations in a plan. The
answer depends upon the popularity of such an option (if it were not the default) and the
difference between the investment manager’s choices and what participants in the program
would have chosen for themselves.
V. Plan Design and Cash Distributions Following Termination
A final aspect of plan design that has the potential to greatly affect long-run retirement asset
accumulation is the treatment of the 401(k) balances of former employees. When an employee
leaves a firm, he or she may request a cash distribution, a direct rollover of 401(k) balances to an
IRA, or a rollover to another employer’s 401(k) plan. If the terminated employee does not make
an explicit request, the balances typically remain in the 401(k) plan. Under current law, however,
if the plan balances are less than $5,000 and the former employee has not elected some sort of
rollover, the employer has the option of compelling a cash distribution. Anecdotally, most
employers exercise this option. There are, however, other choices available. For example, the
firm could elect to maintain the balances of all former employees, regardless of whether the
accumulations exceed $5,000, unless directed to do otherwise. Alternatively, the employer could
automatically roll over the balances of terminated employees into an IRA unless directed to do
otherwise.20
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As with automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, default rollovers have also been sanctioned by the IRS (IRS
Revenue Rulings 2000-36, Internal Revenue Service 2000b).
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Choi et al. (2002) document the important relationship between balance size and the
likelihood that a terminated employee receives a distribution from a 401(k) plan in two
companies, A and C. In Figure 6, we extend their analysis to consider the cash distribution
patterns at two additional companies, H and I. The sample for all four companies is 401(k)
participants whose employment terminated any time between January 1999 and August 2000.
We sort the employees by the size of their 401(k) balances and then divide them into groups of
100. We then calculate the average balance size for each group (the x-axis, plotted on a log scale)
and the average fraction of employees who receive a distribution from the plan by December 31,
2000 (the y-axis). The measure of 401(k) balances used on the x-axis is the average participant
balance as of December 31 of the year prior to the year in which the termination occurred.21 Note
that this measure of balances is likely to understate the actual balances of plan participants at the
time of termination because the incremental contributions made to an individual’s account
between December 31 of the previous year and the date of termination are excluded (as are any
capital gains or losses over this time period).
In three of the four companies, A, C and H, 88 to 91% of terminated participants with prior
year-end balances less than $1,000 receive a cash distribution subsequent to termination. In
Company I, this fraction is lower—about 70% on average. (Interestingly, Company I is a
financial services firm.) In contrast, the fraction of terminated participants with balances over
$5,000 prior to termination who receive a cash distribution is much lower. In Companies C and
H, about one-third receive a cash distribution, while in companies A and I, the fraction lower
still—less than 20%. Between $1,000 and $5,000 in prior year-end balances, the fraction of
terminated participants receiving a distribution falls steadily and substantially at all four firms.
This reflects the decreasing likelihood that terminated participants will have a final balance less
than $5,000.
Of course, even in the case of an automatic cash distribution, former employees have the
option to roll their account balances over into an IRA or the 401(k) plan of another employer.
But previous research suggests that the probability of receiving a cash distribution and rolling it
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That is, employees terminated in 2000 have a balance measure from December 31, 1999, while employees
terminated in 1999 have a balance measure from December 31, 1998. We use this measure of balances because it is
the only measure that we have in our data.
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over into an IRA or another 401(k) plan is very low when the distribution is small. Instead, these
small distributions tend to be consumed.22
The treatment of small account balances following termination is one aspect of plan design
that is likely to change as new government regulations take effect. Under the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), if the account balance of a former
employee is between $1,000 and $5,000, employers will no longer be able to compel a cash
distribution if a former employee does not request a rollover; rather, employers will be required
to establish an IRA on behalf of participants if they do not wish to maintain these accounts
(Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2001). This provision of the law is scheduled to take effect after the
Department of Labor issues final regulations regarding implementation, something that is slated
to happen during 2004.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has surveyed the growing literature on how 401(k) savings are affected by a
myriad of different plan features. The results clearly indicate that plan design affects many
important facets of 401(k) savings behavior. Employers have a large measure of control over
how quickly employees sign up for the 401(k) plan through the enrollment protocol that they
adopt. Employers significantly influence the fraction of salary that employees choose to save
through their choice of the default contribution rate and match threshold. Employers can sway
the asset allocation of employees with the size and composition of the plan’s fund menu. And
employers can facilitate long-term retirement savings by not compelling cash distributions for
employees who terminate with small account balances.
The central finding that plan design matters in economically significant ways places a
tremendous responsibility on both employers and government regulators. Whatever plan design
an employer chooses will favor certain outcomes over others. Employers can try to escape
making tough decisions about how and how much employees ought to be saving for retirement
by giving employees choices and letting them decide for themselves. However, even this type of
laissez-faire plan design will itself influence outcomes relative to other design choices that could
22

Poterba, Venti and Wise (1998) report that the probability that a cash distribution is rolled over into an IRA or
another employer’s plan is only 5 to 16% for distributions of less than $5,000. The overall probability that a cash
distribution is rolled over into an IRA or another employer’s plan or invested in some other savings vehicle is
slightly higher at 14 to 33%.
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have been made. In short, there is no escape. Policymakers should also recognize the importance
of plan design, as they can legislatively encourage and facilitate employer adoption of particular
401(k) designs that foster better retirement savings outcomes for employees.
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TABLE 1. Companies and Their 401(k) Plan Changes or Other Interventions
Plan Change/
Date of Change/
Company Industry
Sizea
Intervention
Intervention
A
Office equipment
30,000
Automatic enrollment
January 1997
B
Insurance
30,000
Automatic enrollment
April 1998
C
Food
20,000
Automatic enrollment
January 1998
D
Insurance
40,000
Change eligibility
January 1997
Eliminate active decision
November 1997
E
Consumer packaged goods 40,000
Change eligibility
July 1998
Instituted employer match
October 2000
F
Pharmaceutical
10,000
Change eligibility
January 1996
G
Utility
10,000
Increased match threshold
January 1997
H
Retail
130,000 None
NA
I
Financial Services
50,000
None
NA
a
Number of employees (rounded to the nearest 10,000) on December 31, 2000 (Companies A, C, D,
E, H, I), June 30, 2000 (Company B), or December 31, 1998 (Companies F, G).
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FIGURE 1A. 401(k) Participation by Tenure:
Company A
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FIGURE 1B. 401(k) Participation by Tenure:
Company B
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FIGURE 1C. 401(k) Participation by Tenure for Employees
Aged 40+ at Hire: Company C
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FIGURE 2. Fraction of Employees Ever Participating in the
401(k) Plan by Tenure: Company D

FIGURE 3A. Waiting Periods and 401(k) Participation:
Company D
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FIGURE 3B. Waiting Periods and 401(k) Participation:
Company E
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FIGURE 3C. Waiting Periods and 401(k) Participation:
Company F
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FIGURE 4A. Default Savings Behavior and Tenure:
Company A
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FIGURE 4B. Default Savings Behavior and Tenure:
Company B
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0

6

12

18

24

30

Tenure (months)
Hired before AE: Default rate and fund
Hired before AE: Default rate (3%)
Hired before AE: 100% in default fund

34

Hired after AE: Default rate and fund
Hired after AE: Default rate (3%)
Hired after AE: 100% in default fund

36

FIGURE 4C. Default Savings Behavior and Tenure of
Employees Aged 40+ at Hire: Company C
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FIGURE 5A. The Distribution of Contribution Rates by Date
of Initial Hire: Company E
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FIGURE 5B. The Distribution of Initial Contribution Rates
by Date of Initial Participation: Company G
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FIGURE 6A. Balances and the Probability of a Cash Distribution: Company A
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FIGURE 6B. Balances and the Probability of a Cash Distribution: Company C
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FIGURE 6C. Balances and the Probability of a Cash Distribution: Company H
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FIGURE 6D. Balances and the Probability of a Cash Distribution: Company I
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